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SUMMARY
Despite a dramatic shift away from subsidies in the early years of transition, the  countries of
Central  Europe  still  show  signs  of  an  unsuccessful  fiscal  adjustment,  insufficient  deficit
reduction and loose expenditure policy. Consequently, high social transfers and low efficiency of
govemment  spending  remain  two  main  challenges  of  fiscal  adjustnents  and  long-term
sustainability of budgetary policy choices. The cross-country regression analysis shows that the
problems with high social security outlays are largely due to loose eligibility criteria (i.e. to a
large number of early retirees) under current state pay-as-you-go pension  systems - and not so
much to  old  populations or high  replacement rates.  It  is suggested  that transition  countries
should reach social consensus on the refonn of future pension rights. The transition to a funded
pension system could be financed by a combination of:  (i) government debt, (ii) privatisation
proceeds, (iii) efficiency gains from lowering and/or restructuring of government expenditure in
favour of infrastructure, retraining and  market-oriented tertiary education.
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21. Introduction
Fiscal sector reform is an integral part of medium-term strategies for sustainable growth in the
CEC's  (i.e. Central European Countries). Governments in transition economies face a difficult
task of  working both on the quantity and the quality of fiscal adjustments. The quantity of fiscal
adjustment corresponds to a need to contain short-term fiscal imbalances. The quality of fiscal
adjustment  requires  the  "structural  "  fiscal  sector  reform  which  will  reduce  the  still
overwhelming  role  of  the  state  in  the  CEC's  by  reordering  expenditure  priorities  and
reorganising the tax system. The study focuses on the structural, market-oriented fiscal reform
which can be guided by the following traditional principles of government action: Efficiency,
Equity, Macroeconomic stability, taking into account the more specific constraints of feasibility
and sustainability in transition countries.
This  paper  relies  mainly  on  cross-country  comparisons  to  assess  budgetary  priorities  and
burdens. Reforms should not necessarily imitate the fiscal structure found in the other parts of the
world. Nevertheless, persistent differences should  be justified by specific conditions or specific
objectives of the CEC in the people's and taxpayers' interests.
31.1. Comparative budgetary structure:  Some statistical facts
Some stylised facts of comparative budgetary structure  (see Table la)  are as follows:
(1) A very high but somewhat declining share of GDP is redistributed by the general government
in a typical CEC.
(2) For the structure of government revenues (see Table 1  a) three facts stand out:
* The reliance on the indirect taxes (including domestic taxes on goods and services or turnover
taxes & international trade taxes) was  'low', but is rising.
*  The share of social security contributions in  government revenue is already higher than in the
OECD and is expected to  rise.
*  Reliance on  personal income and property taxes is low, but reliance on profit taxes used to be
very  high and it declined sharply.
(3) Comparing the structure of expenditures  (see Table lb) reveals four key orientations:
*  CEC have reached high level of social security outlays , which amounted for  45% of total
expenditure  in 1992. In* Asian and Latin American countries  ( with lower GDP per capita and
low government spending), social expenditure is  only 14% while some of them experience fast
real GDP growth.
4Table la. Regional Breakdown of Economic Performance
Regional Unweighed Averages
Indicator






GDP per capita in current  19489  n.a.  3379  2356 (without
$  Singapore)
Government  44.33  54.2  50.8  19.91
Expenditure in % of
GDP
Government  42.6  50.7  47.6  19.77
Revenue
in % of GDP
Inflation Rate  8.14  n.a.  27.73  14.29  (without
Argentina)
Unemployment Rate  8.50  0.0  11.90  4.67
Direct Taxes in % of  33.65  24.78  20.52  30.56
Expenditure
Indirect Taxes in % of  29.07  29.89  31.10  55.49
Expenditure
Borrowing  and others  in  14.29  20.85  14.91  5.32
% of Expenditure
Source:  Fakin  & de Crombrugghe  (1996),  p.6.
5Table  lb. Regional  Breakdown  of Government  Expenditure  by  Type
Type of  Regional Averages  Type of
Government  Government
Expenditure by  Expenditure by
Function  Economic
in % of Total  Classification
Expenditure  in % of Total
Expenditure
OECD  Central Europe  Asia  &
Latin America
1988/89(*)  1992
Subsidies  2.03  26  7  17.96  Subsidies
Economic  10.59  18.90  16.74
Services
Health  12.62  13.20  X  7.07l
Education  12.35  8.58  15.09
Defence  2.54  1.73  11.72
13.61  8.08  13.33( )  21.94  Wages
6.64  5.62  4.15  17.52  Investment
General Public  25.33  6.14  7.64
Services &
Other
43.18  40.52  31.07  18.8  Goods and
Services & Other
Source: Fakin & de Crombrugghe (1996), p.7.
Note: (*) Data for Slovenia are non available.
6*Explicit  subsidisation remains above the OECD average but  has been reduced  significantly.
Under  central  planning,  subsidies complemented taxes  as instruments  of  the plan  . Implicit
subsidies (usually not reported) remain widespread. They take the form of  tax reductions  and in
some cases privileged credits.
*CEC  devote a higher share of their expenditure on health than on education. The converse
applies in Asian and Latin American countries, while OECD  countries give about the same share
to each  (12%). Given the potential contribution of education to growth and even to health, the
priorities of the CEC's seem awkward.
UGovernment  investment  fell quite dramatically under  the recent  financial pressures on the
budget . This  might be  seen  as  a missed  opportunity  for growth,  especially  in  the  field  of
infrastructural investment.'
To conclude, the current situation in the CEC, with increased transfers and government wages
may indicate  (especially with coalition governments):
First,  unsuccessful  fiscal  adjustment  with  insufficient  deficit  reduction  and  loose
expenditure policy29
Second, the preference for care over opportunities 3.
'See also de Crombrughe  and  Lipton (1994).
2 Alesina and Perotti (1995).
3Opportunities dominate in Asia, where subsidies are actually lower than in Latin America and targeted towards
business development rather than business protection (Rodrik, 1995). See also de Crombrugghe, (1994).
71.2. The questions
The dramatic change of macroeconomic policy environment after the beginning of transition  in
1989 forced most of transition countries into budgetary retrenchment and structural adjustment.
The  analysis  in  section  1.1.  appears  to  suggest  that  social  transfers  and  efficiency  of
government spending  represent  two main challenges for the long-term sustainability of
budgetary and policy choices in transition economies.
From  the policy  perspective  the  following questions  are  extremely  important.  Does  (e  big»)
govermments in the CEC spend efficiently taxpayers' money?  If  the social transfers are  <<  too
high >, what are the  structural determinants of social transfers (pensions)? How do the size of
the government and the level of social transfers affect intergenerational equity (i.e. equality in
current income)? If CEC are to initiate fiscal adjustment in the field of social spending, which
pension reforn  strategy should  they pursue? And last but not least, how to pay for the cost of the
pension reform?
1.3. The outline
The paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section 2  briefly  reviews  the  literature.  Section  3  uses
regression estimates to identify the main determinants of taxes and expenditure across countries.
The focus is  on the impact of the age structure of population and the retirement policy  on social
transfers  across  countries.  In  section  4  we  discuss  the results  of  non-parametric  efficiency
analysis, and possible  avenues for budgetary reform and  saving.  Section 5 provides a  policy
8recommendation. It stipulates various ways of financing a transition to the multipillar pension
system and its implications for the efficiency of  public spending. Section 6 concludes. Sample
and variable description are given in appendix.
2. A brief literature review
Although  of  extreme policy  relevance  in  the  periods  of  structural  reforms,  changes  in  the
composition  of  a  government's  budget  are  usually  omitted  from  standard  macroeconomic
analysis. A comprehensive theory of public expenditure is still missing; the existing literature is
mainly  empirical.  Our  paper  draws  from  four  strands  of  this  literature.  The  first  is  the
comparative analysis of patterns of government expenditure (and taxation ). Heller and Diamond
(1990) observed in developing countries a marked change in expenditure priorities  away from
fixed assets and capital transfers toward  interest, subsidy and transfer payments.  Burgess and
Stern (1993) studied tax structure in developing and industrial economies to uncover patterns of
taxation most suited to different types of countries. Studies of transition countries focus on the
relation between  budget balance and budget composition (Transition Report, 1994; Barbone and
Marchetti, 1995; Barbone and Polackova, 1996; Dabrowski, 1995, Fakin and de Crombrugghe,
1996; Sachs, 1995;  World Development Report, 1996). They all note a fast expansion in social
welfare  expenditure. A  second source  is the work on fiscal  adjustments  in  OECD countries
especially, the observation by Alesina and Perotti (1995) that countries which did not restructure
the expenditure were less able to maintain fiscal equilibrium. Our third source is the literature on
non-parametric  efficiency  analysis  (Tulkens,  1993),  more  specifically  the  cost-efficiency
9approach  which  was applied to  the Belgian  municipalities  by Vanden  Eeckaut, Tulkens  and
Jamar (1993).  Fourth, the  policy implications of our empirical analysis can be related to a vast
policy-oriented  literature 4 on:  (i) the  choice of  a tax  system  (Musgrave &  Musgrave,  1984;
Newbery,  1993 &  1995), on the design of a social security system (Feldstein,  1974; Hombug,
1990; Breyer and Stroub, 1993; Averting the Old-Age Crisis, 1994;  Gruner, 1995;), and on the
growth-diminishing  effect  of  distortionary  taxes  and  growth-enhancing  effect  of  productive
government  services (Barro,  1990 &  1991; Barro and  Sala-i-Martin,  1995; Cashin,  1994; de
Long and Summers, 1991; Sachs and Warner, 1996).
3. Structural determinants of social transfers
3.1. General  environment
Social  transfers  have  been  identified  as  a  major  and  growing  item  of  total  government
expenditure in transition countries. Moreover they appear as a distinctive feature compared to the
other countries. A first step in the analysis is to try to find the structural determinants of social
spending as a part of the overall tax and expenditure policy of a broad sample of countries.
In Table 2, the main components of public revenue and  expenditure are regressed  on the key
constraints identified in the literature: income per capita (at purchasing power parity) and the old-
age dependency ratio (number of people younger than 65 years). Regional Dummnies  are added for
Central Europe (Dummy 1), Latin America (Dummy 2) and Western Europe (Dummy 3). The base
Detailed discussion of this source would exceed the purpose of our study.
10year for cross-country  regressions  is, given  the availability  and comparability  of statistical  data,  the
year 1992.
The seemingly  unrelated  regression  (SUR)  method  has been used. It exploits  more efficiently the
information contained in the residuals. The SUR estimation (Zellner, 1962) deals with the
unobserved  country  specific  determinants  of expenditure  across  equations  which  may  be the same.
Indeed  there is some correlation  between  the residuals  for some  countries  across  single equations.
In addition,  we effectively  deal  with shares  of different  categories  of govermnent  spending  in GDP.
The following  results  are relevant  to the social security  transfers.
(1) Income per capita is a  significant determinant of the share of social spending in GDP as of
the shares  of total,  health  and education  expenditure  in GDP.  On the revenue  side income  per capita
explains  wealcy  the share  of social  security  contributions  in GDP.  It has a significant  positive  effect
on direct  taxes  an a negative  one on indirect  taxes.  5
(2) The age structure  of population,  i.e. old-age  dependency  ratio (DDO  is the ratio of working-
age population  and the old people),  has no significant  effect on (total and) social spending  once
the <<  European  Effect  >>  (i.e. the oldest  populations  in the sample)  is taken into account.  It still has a
marginally  significant  effect  on health  expenditure.
5 The positive  relation  between  income  per capita  and total  spending  (EXPGDP  is total  public  expenditure  in % of
GDP)  is especially  significant  when purchasing  power  parity  adjusted  GDP  (GDPHS)  is used rather  than the current
dollars  (GDP$WB,  see Table  on p.33 in Fakin  and de Crombrugghe,  1996). A positive  relation  can be explained
by a high cost of a number  of public  goods and social  provisions  included  in public  spending.  It is also  difficult to
tax poorer  and rather  informal  economies.  The estimated  regression  coefficients  are higher  with GDPHS  than with
GDP$WB  (compare  Table  2 with  Table on p.33 in Fakin and de Crombrugghe,  1996).  This  is in line with  the
emparical  observation  that  rich countries  have a lower  GDP in purchasing  power  parities  than in current  $, while the
contrary  is true for poor countries.
11It is interesting to  note, that another structural variable, the share of population living in cities
turned out to be globally insignificant, while it was itself strongly correlated with GDP per capita
and the Latin American dummy. In addition, the acceptance of inequality could have played a role.
But the ex-post measures that we have (like the share of income in the richest decile), performed
poorly in this broad sample, while showing some negative correlations with GDP per capita, the
Western and Central European dummies and  a positive correlation with Latin America.
(3) In addition to the income per capita effect there is an even stronger o European Effect o in
social spending and in social security contributions  6. The coefficients for the CEC Dummy are
even larger than those for the European Union. It means that experiences and  policy solutions from
the OECD are of direct relevance for reforms in the CEC.
6  Speaking  of regional  effect,  the positive  correlation  of subsidies  of Latin  America  (Dummy  2) is noteworthy.
Subsidies  are relatively  difficult  to explain  with structural  variables.  They  are discretionary  and despite  some succes
stories  in Asia,  their contribution  to the economic  performance  remains  uncertain.
12Table  2. SUR  Estimates  for Taxes and Functional  Expenditure  (GDPHS)
Const  DUMMY  DUMMY  DUMMY  DDO  GDPHS  R
2 F
_  I  2  3
.SCAL  -4.31  14.73  1.47  7.69  -4#2  3.89E4  71.6:  -16.
(0..6>  (519"*)  (0.86)  :(.0.?  (1.93+.
__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  . ........._::-_,,-,.I
DIRECT  -4.87  5.56  -1.03  5.79  0.58  9.45 E4  58.1  8.89
(-0.94)  (1.88+)  (-0.56)  (2.76**)  (1.83+)  (4.35**)
TTAXGDP  13.70  3.72  -0.97  3.94  -0.26  2.72 E-4  56.6  9.1
(4.44**)  (2.04*)  (-1.68)  (3.13**)  (-1L3)  (-2.03*)
EXPGDP  17.28  25.38  -3.27  17.37  -0.01  11.97  E4  87.1  47.2
(2.77**)  (6.80**)  (-1.36)  (6.67*t*)  (-O  03)  (4.44**)
|SUBSIDY  -0.51  2.53  3.20  1.37  0.33  2.30 E-5  34.5  3.5
(-014)  (1.21)  (2.54*)  (0.92)  (1.49)  (0.15)
BEALT'HGDP  3.95  -0.10  -0.28  0.41  -0.25  3.76 E-4  77.5  23.4
(1.83+)  (-0.08)  (-0.36)  (0.48)  (-1-91+)  (4.06**)
EDUGDP  2.39  1.17  -0.50  1.01  aoos5  1.77 E-4  57.2  8.0
(1.49)  (1.29)  (-0.91)  (I.57)  (0.05)  (2.65*)
Legend:
highly significant ... ** < 0.01
significant  ...  * < 0.05
marginally significant ... + < 0.10
+ or -denotes  the sign of estimated  regression  coefficient
Method  of estimation:  SUR  i.e. seemingly  unrelated  regressions  (Zellner,  1962).
See  Appendix III for variable  descriptions  and rules  of presentation.
Source: Fakin and de Crombrugghe (1996), p.9; see also pp.33-34.
133.2. Early retirement and the generosity of the pension system
Apart from the global significance of GDP per capita, the aggregate analysis identified a strong
<<  European Effect >>  for social transfers, total expenditure, and  for social contributions. The CEC
have a low income per capita, but seem to follow West-European  patterns in social transfers, rather
than take their place on the income line. This section tries to see whether this 'European specificity'
can be explained (see Table 3 below) in  a  'narrow sample' of  OECD and  CEC.
Table  3. Social Transfers,  Government  Wages  and Effective  Dependency  Ratios




ADR  -0.25  -0.02  0.03  60.3  None/
(-445**)  (-3.83**)  (4.80**)  10.1  SIo.  -0.2
24  Po. -0.2
ADR  -0.25  -0.02  -0.002  0.03  64.7  None/
(-3.97**)  (-3.57**)  (-0.97)  (4.84**)  227  PCR.  -0.1 
GDP$WB  DDO  GLABOUR  SOCWAGE  TRANSFER  R
2 Missing/
(*  OE-4)  F  Residuals
_  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  O bs.
SOCEXP  -3.23  -0.53  0.38  62.6  None/
(-1.51)  (-2.44*)  (5.16**)  10.0  Cz.R.-10.8
22  Po.  -8.0
Sbo.  +8.2
SOCGDP  -2.33  0.28  78.4  None/
(-2.90**)  (8.53**)  36.8  Cz.R. -5.2
23  Po.  -4.0
WAGESEXP  -6.32  -0.25  61.7  Slo./
(-3.31**)  (-3.55**)  15.3  Hu..  -6.6
1  1  1  1  1  1 ~~~  ~~~~~~~~~22  Cz.R. -8.3
Note:
In  the  regression  for  WAGESEXP,  GDPHS  as  well  as  DUMMYI  were  significantly  negative,  the  latter  being
accompanied  with  stronger  income  effect.  ADR  was marginally  significant  and  positive.  GINVGDP  was  significantly
positive.  Regressors  GINVEXP,  POPULATION  and UNEMPLOY  were nonsignificant.
Regressors  DUMMYI,  GDPHS,  POPULATION,  INEQUAL,  UNEMPLOY,  ADR,  GINVGDP,  GINVEXP  were  never
significant  in the regressions  for  SOCEXP  and SOCGDP.  In  ADR regressions  INEQUAL,  INVGDP,  SOCGDP  were
never  significant.  DUMMYI  was  highly  significant  in  combination  with  UNEMPLOY  and  GLABOUR,  where
GLABOUR  turned out to be insignificant  and R
2 was only 46.3.
See  Appendix  III for variable description  and rules of presentation.
14First,  we try to explain the actual number of retirees, measured by the actual dependency ratio
(ADR).  Second, we examine the relation between shares of social expenditure in total public
spending and in GDP (SOCEXP & SOCGDP) with demography and  income policy choices.
The actual dependency (ADR) is largely explained by the demographic dependency ratio (DDO),
as could be  expected. The generosity of the benefits, measured by the wage replacement rate
(SOCWAGE) seems however to have no effect on the actual number of retirees of the countries
in  the sample. Other variables  nevertheless have a  small  but  significant effect: the share  of
government  employment  in  total  employment  (GLABOUR,  negative  effect)  and  the
unemployment  rate  (UNEMPLOY,  positive  effect).  This  last  variable  indicates  that  early
retirement  is  a  way  to  deal  with  unemployment,  but  not  to  eliminate  it.  Job  security  in
government reduces the cases of early retirement and may actually be a substitute for it in case of
labour market problems. These observations point to the eligibility rules in the determination of
the number of retirees.
Social  expenditure as  a  share of  government expenditure (SOCEXP)  or as  a  share  of  GDP
(SOCGDP) depends upon the number of retirees as expected, but  also and very  significantly
upon the generosity of the benefits (SOCWAGE). Given the previous observation on the number
of retirees, simultaneity problems in the econometric estimation can be expected to be minimal.
Nevertheless  we preferred to use the demographic dependency ratio DDO as a regressor here
rather than the actual one (ADR).
15Our  observations  have  important  retirement  policy  implications:  The  absence  of  relation
between the number of retirees and the benefits they earn gives governments two independent
policy  instruments:  eligibility  rules  and  the  generosity of  the  benefits.  With  a  given  social
security budget it would thus be possible to raise  pensions and tighten access, or the converse. It
should also be possible to reduce the relatively large burden of social expenditure by raising the
effective retirement age, keeping benefits constant.
The absence  of relation between income per  capita and retirement  or retirement  spending  is
noteworthy. In the larger sample of  Table 2, there was a positive relation but  also  a strong
European effect. In fact most of the European countries of the OECD and the Central Europe
were above the income line. It is thus normal that the relation vanished in the smaller sample.
The purpose of Table 3 is to explain the determinants of the European effect.
It  is  also  interesting  to  point  to  two  variables  which  tend  to  reduce  government  wage
expenditure: income per capita and social transfers. The negative relation with income per capita
was also present in the larger sample for the SUR regressions of the economic classification of
expenditure (Fakin and de Crombrugghe, 1996, Table 2b). Rich countries seem to have found a
way to  master their wage  expenditure despite usually higher wage  levels and higher relative
wage costs. For any given level of income per capita, the possibility to substitute government
wage expenditure for social transfers seems to be present  as it is for government employment as
a substitute for early retirement.
16To  conclude  generally  on  pensions  and  government  employment:  It  seems  that  national
preferences dominate price and income effects. Some governments just  choose to retire more
people, other to employ more of them.  Most governments choose retirement when they also face
unemployment. The total cost of high unemployment and abundant retirement is usually high.
But the generosity of the individual transfers (SOCWAGE) can vary, and so explains the cost of
the policy, given the number of beneficiaries.8 The number of beneficiaries is indeed controlled
administratively by the design of the pension system - and is, assuming that pensions are usually
attractive,  the result of an  independent policy choice. Specifically, the problems with high
social security outlays in the CEC are largely due to  the excessive number of early retirees,
i.e. to loose eligibility criteria for early retirement under the current pensions systems.
3.3. Expenditure policy choices
Finally we note (see Table 4)  that total government expenditure in the OECD and CEC's tends
to be independent of income per capita - as is social expenditure - but to be related to specific
policy choices. Unequality, measured by the share of income of the 1  0 percent richest, appears as
a key  determinant for low government spending in  the sample. 9 Egalitarian countries tend to
spend more as do countries with a large government payroll or with generous pension benefits
7  For the  unemployment problem in Europe compared to the  United States a similar idea is expressed  in CEPR
(1995).
8  It is important to clarify that pensions are not too high in the sense that they would attract a lot of people into
early retirement out of the labour force. 'The incentive effect' of pensions is in fact ruled out by the institutionalized
eligibility criteria  (under pay-as-you-go systems). Rather, in some countries pensions may be  too high because,
given the number of pensioners, the replacement rates (SOCWAGE) are too high.
9  We could not find the same relation between  social spending and unequality. Other elements of total spending
play an egalitarian role, possibly government employment. Social spending depending on the way it is targeted and
the way it raises the income of the insiders at the expense of the outsiders could also contribute to unequality.
Further research would be needed.
17(SOCWAGE). The high government expenditures are also linked with a low share of investment
spending in the total (GINVEXP).
The low investment of high spenders may be a cause of a slower growth of income per capita in
the long  run. We have not  been able to  test this  growth effect,  especially given the  limited
significance  of  any  recent  growth  figures  for  Central  Europe. Nevertheless  referring  to  the
literature quoted in the section 2, it can be expected that low investment and large tax distortions
are harmful for growth. Social security can be efficiency enhancing in the few cases where it
raises  the productivity  of the  labour force by  selecting the most  productive  workers but  its
financing on a pay-as-you-go basis can have negative effects on investment and hence on growth.
Table  4. The Size  of Public  Redistribution
GDPHS  INEQUAL  GLABOUR  GINVEXP  1TAXREV  SOCWAGE  R
2 Missing/ 3  (*  OE-3)  F  Residuals
Obs.
EXPGDP  -0.99  0.54  -0.91  0.12  82.4  Cz.RJ I  (-2 26*)  (2.69*)  (-2.62*)  (1.90+)  16.4  Hu. -5.3
Note:
Regressors  DUMMYI, DDO, ADRDDO,  ADR were not significant.  DEBTGDP  was marginally  significant in a
regression  with  INEQUAL  and GLABOUR.
See Appendix  III for variable  description  and rules of presentation.
Source:  Fakin and de Crombrugghe  (1996),  p.12.
The regression analysis of total and social expenditure thus shows that the CEC's and many of
the other European countries are off the income line and have opted for generous and/or
easy accessible social transfers, large government payrolls and egalitarian distribution of
income. They face nevertheless high unemployment and  low investment rates. We leave  the
18growth effects of these choices to the other branches of the literature. We now turn to another
type  of  evaluation of  these policy  choices: the  efficiency analysis. This  is  necessary to  see
whether the high spenders dominate the low spenders in a number of performance indicators
related to government action and public welfare or should learn from countries which perform as
well at a lower cost.
4. Efficiency of public spending
The medium-term strategy for the reform of the budget  should include elements for monitoring
the efficiency of government performance. Non-parametric efficiency analysis (Tulkens, 1993;
Vanden Eeckaut, Tulkens, Jamar, 1993) is just an example of how the efficiency of  government
spending can be tested.'0 It compares a number  of outputs (government services) with the input
cost (represented by the aggregate governnent  expenditure). The output indicators used in the
illustrative  test  were:  patents,  university  entry,  infant  mortality,  life  expectancy,  old-age
demographic  dependency  ratio  and  telephone  mainlines.  This  list  includes  two  important
parameters of the pension  system namely demographic dependency ratio and life expectancy.
Each output indicator is  a full variable and it is never weighted.  A country is identified  as
inefficient only  if there is another country which does better  in all output indicators  with no
more  government  expenditure. A  better  performance than the  lower  spenders in  any  single
indicator saves a country from inefficiency. The results are summarised in Table 5 below.
"O  For the conceptual  framework, and its application to the poverty problems and corresponding social expenditure
policies see Cornia et.all. (1987), and Pleskovic & Sivitanides (1993).
19Table 5. Summary of Cost-Inefficiency Cases
Inefficient  EXPGDP  Potential  Expenditure  Potential  Expenditure  Potential
revisions  of  per capita  in  revisions  of  in  current  $  revisions  of
spending  in  PPP  spending  in  per  capita  spending  in
the sample  the sample  the sample
B1lg.um  i55.2  10024  1J
Hungary  54.5  7
Poland  50.7  15
StQvem  .... 10..35.2.
Czech  48.5  7
Republic
Greece  47.1  2
Portugal  39.3  1  .
Note: See  Appendix  II for details.
Source:  Fakin  and  de Crombrugghe  (1996),  p.23; 22-25  for detailed  description  of results.
Judged by the sample of the OECD and CEC's, the striking result is that a transition economy
can find between 7 and 15 countries"  which spend a lower share of current GDP,  and reach
better results on all the performance indicators selected for the test. It may seem that the private
sector in  CEC can contribute to the  satisfaction of  our performance indicators.  This  doesn't
invalidate our indicators at all. On the contrary,  it reminds especially transition countries that the
welfare  objectives  of  the  society  require  a  government  intervention  only  where  there  is  a
The list  of countries  is given in appendix  III.
20demonstrated market failure. Furthermore, such an intervention doesn't  always take the form of
direct provision of services but also (above all)  the form of regulation 12
An additional  output indicator, which has not been  used to  set up Table 5 is the degree  of
income inequality. If the income inequality is measured by the share of income of the 10 percent
richest,  the  CEC's  and  Belgium  would  become  efficient  because  all  the  countries  whose
government spends less have a more unequal income distribution. The share of income of the 40
percent poorest is probably a better indicator of the social role of the state. Using this indicator, it
is still possible to find a few countries where the poor get more while the government spend less
than in Belgium  and the CEC's. This discussion of income redistribution also shows the price at
which it comes: huge government expenditures and poor performances in all other indicators of
public action. Newbery (1993 and 1995) also suggests that the reforming CEC's  could tolerate
some increase in income unequality in order to achieve a better overall performance.
It  thus  seems plausible that  CEC could lower their government expenditure and/or
restructure  in favour  of infrastructure,  retraining  and market  -oriented  tertiary  education.
Such fiscal adjustment can be expected to improve their medium-term performance in efficiency
indicators,  and to enhance long-run economic growth. The question is, how to shift  government
spending away from social transfers?
12  As for  instance,  an old-age  income  insurance  under  a funded  pension  system  rather  than  state  pensions  on a pay-
as-you-go  basis.
215. Pension Reform
The CECs'  governments are facing the problems of: (i) high social security outlays due to loose
eligibility  criteria under  the  current  state  pay-as-you  go pension  system,  and  (ii)  given the
structure of  government expenditure, relatively  low efficiency of public  spending.  To  solve
these problems  the CECs  should reach social consensus on the reform of  future pension
'3 rights.  In  other words,  they  should  introduce  a  multipillar  pension  system  , which  would
recognise  the  diversity  of national  circumstances and  operationalise  the  introduction  of  a
country-specific combination of the two pure pension systems: capitalisation system and pay-as-
you-go-system. It is important to note that: First, the introduction of a (partially) funded system
creates an  extra cost,  as when a pay-as-you-go system was introduced the first generation of
retirees was made strictly better-off. Second, if the transition from the present  state pay-as-you-
go  system  is  successful,  the  pension  reform  would  be  growth  enhancing.  Third,  selective
generosity  and in particular,  eligibility criteria are much  less of a  financial problem under  a
funded pension system.'4 The crucial question therefore is: Which tax instruments are to be used
to finance transition?
Based on the theory a transition from a pay-as-you-go to capitalisation system can be financed by
different tax instruments: (1) lump-sum contributions (Breyer and Stroub, 1993) in the form of
1  Following  the proposition  made by International  institutions  (Averting  the Old-Age-Crisis,  1994), the pension
system  would have three pillars: Pillar I is a mandatory,  tax financed,  public pay-as-you-go  system; Pillar 2 is
mandatory  and fully funded  pension  system;  and  Pillar 3 is private  owned  and fully funded.
14  We demonstrated (see Table 3) that one of the main factors of excessive  social transfers  is selective generosity.
Pensions in the funded system are unequal because savings are unequal and not because of unequal expenditure.
Furthermore, eligibility criteria are not such a problem under the funded system as the retirement date is a function
of savings. To the contary, under the state pay-as-you-go system retirement date is uniformly legislated.
22an uniform ceiling of maximal pensions, (2) consumption tax (Feldstein,  1994), (3) external or
public government debt (Hombug, 1990),  (4) state assets (International Institutions), and  (5)
inheritance (wealth) taxation or taxation of bequests (Gruner, 1995). There are however  a few
practical limitations which has to be taken into account. Further  increases of  indirect taxation
(i.e. introduction of environmental taxes and/or increased sales taxes)  would indeed improve the
efficiency of the tax  system and  increase public income generating capacity15,  but might  be
detrimental to the  intergenerational equity (i.e. equality in current income). Inheritance taxation
doesn't  seem to be a practically viable solution,  as the share of wealth taxes in government
revenues  in most of developed countries account for less than 3% of GDP. Similarly, lump-sum
contributions can not be practically implemented.  We therefore propose that CECs finance the
pension reform by a combination of: (i)  external or public government debt (ii) state assets
canalised  from  privatisation  programmes,  and  given  the  results  of  our  analysis,  (iii)
efficiency gains 16 from lowering and restructuring of public spending,  and  possibly,  by
further increases in sales taxes and introduction of environmental taxes.
6. Conclusions
In summary, the main findings of comparative analysis of patterns of government expenditure
and  taxation  in  CECs vs.  OECD  countries are  as  follows.  First  of  all  we  found  a  strong
<<  European Effect )), which indicate that CEC are not so much different from OECD countries
for social  security contributions  and outlays.  Consequently, experiences and  policy  solutions
15  Measured  as a share  of revenues  in GDP.
16  Expenditure  management  is most likely  growth-enhancing  and increases  the amount  of fiscal  revenue given the
share of taxes in GDP.
23from  the  OECD  do  matter  for  the  CEC.  Second,  regression  analysis  demonstrate  that  the
problems  with  social  security  spending  is  largely  due  to  loose  eligibility  criteria  for  early
retirement,  i.e. to  a  large number of early retirees. Third, non-parametric  efficiency  analysis
reveals (<  cost-inefficiency >>  of transition  governments. It  seems that CEC the  could enhance
their efficiency by lowering and restructuring their government expenditure. The reform of future
pension rights would  contribute to this end. Fourth, it is recommended to introduce a country-
specific multipillar pension system . The transition from current pay-as-you-go to capitalisation
system need to be  financed by a combination of:  (a) government debt, (b) state assets derived
from privatisation, (c ) efficiency gains from expenditure management.
247. Appendix
L.  Regression  Estimates
a) A NOTE ON THE  REGRESSION  TABLES 2,3,4.
The  tables  always  contain  the following  irdormation.
Equations  are in  rows.  Independent  variables  (regressors)  are  on top  of each  column.
R2 is the determination  coefficient.
T-statistics  are in parenthesis.
Significance levels are indicated as follows **  < 1%,  * <  5%, +< 10%.
Symbols  for variables  with description  are given in the table "List  of Variables  and Country Samples  and Dummy
Variables",  below.
Single  regressions  were estimated  for an alphabetically  ordered  sample  of OECD  and  Transition  countries.
Missing  observations  and  residuals  are explicitly  named  for transition  countries  only.
(Abbreviations:  Cz.R.  for Czech  Republic,  Hu.  for Hungary,  Po. for Poland,  Slo. for  Slovenia)
Residuals  are given for  transition  countries  when  they  exceed  the one-standard-deviation  band.
b) Seemingly Unrelated  Regressions  were estimated for  an  alphabetically ordered sample  of  OECD, Transition
countries,  Latin  American  and East  Asian  Countries.
25II. Non-Parametric Efficiency Analysis
Table. Efficiency  Analysis
Inefficient  EXPGDP  Degree  Comparator  EXPPP  Degree  EXPS  Degree
BELGIUM  55.2  95.8  NORWAY  10024  95.2  |
Hungary  54.5  64.2  Switzerland  - -
70.3  Spain  |
72.8  United Kingdom  |
81.5  Germany  |
83.9  Austria  ---
89.0  France
97.1  Norway  - - - -
ITALY  51.3  89.1  AUSTRIA  9095  92.2  10496  97.4
Poland  50.7  50.1  Japan  - - - -
69.0  Switzerland  -
71.8  USA----
72.2  Australia  |
73.2  New Zealanid----
75.5  Spain  |
(77.5  Portugal)  |
78.3  United Kingdom  |
82.6  Ireland  |
87.6  Germany  |
90.1  Austria  l
(92.9  Greece)  |
94.5  Canada  |
95.7  France  ---
(97.4  Slovenia)  - -
SLOVENIA  49.4  51.4  JAPAN  5335  96.0
70.9  Switzerland  - -
74.9  Australia  l
75.1  New-Zealand  l
80.4  United Kingdom  -
84.8  IRELAND  94.8  l
89.9  Gertnany  - ---
92.5  Austria  -
97.0  Canada  -
98.2  France  - _
Czech Republic  48.5  72.2  Switzerland  -
75.1  USA  ----
79.0  Spain  -
81.9  United Kingdom  -
91.5  Germany  -
94.2  Austria  -
100.0  France  -
Greece  47.1  74.3  Switzerland  -
97.0  Austria
Portugal  39.3  87 1  Switzerland  - -
26Note:
EXPPP  = EXP$/$PPP  where  EXP$  = (EXPGDP*GDP$WB)/100.  and $PPP  = GDP$WB/GDPPPWB
where: EXPPP ..... government  expenditure  per capita in 1992 purchasing  power  dollars, EXP$  ..... government
expenditure  per capita  in 1992  US$, $PPP  .the  dollar  price  of one unit  of PPP,  PPP .purchasing  power  parity  of
I US$.
Source:  Fakin  and de Crombrugghe  (1996),  pp.30-3  1.
27III.  List of Variables and Country Samples with Dummy Variables
Table. List of Variables with Symbols
SYMBOL  VARIABLE
ADR  actual dependency ratio  (RETIREES/EMPLOYED)
DDO  old age demographic dependency ratio (i.e. working age population (I 5-64)/old people
(65 and 65+))
DIRECT  direct taxes in % of GDP (direct taxes = corporate taxes + individual  taxes)
DIRTAX  direct taxes in % of taxes, fees and contributions (DIRECT/TAXES*  100)
DUMMY 1  transition dummy
DUMMY 2  Latin-American  dummy
DUMMY 3  European union & Norway dummy
EDUGDP  public expenditure on education in % of GDP
EMPLOYED  employees in thousands
EXPGDP  total public expenditure in % of GDP
EXP$  the 1992 US$ total government expenditure per capita (EXPGDP*GDP$WB/100)
EXPPP  the 1992 purchasing power parity dollar total government expenditure per capita
(EXP$/$PPP)
GDPPPWB  GDP per capita in the 1992 purchasing power parity dollars
GDP$WB  GDP per capita in current international  $
GDPHS  Heston-Summers gross domestic product in purchasing power parities per capita
GINVEXP  government investmnent  in % of total public spending (GINVGDP/EXPGDP * 100)
GINVGDP  government investment in % of GDP
GLABOUR  government employment in % of total employment employees in public administration and
defence, education services, medical and health services, and other in % of total
employment
LHEALTHEXP  health expenditure in % of total public spending
HEALTHGDP  health expenditure in % of GDP  (HEALTHEXP*EXPGDP/1  00)
INDIRECT  indirect  taxes in % of GDP (indirect taxes = domestic taxes on goods and services +
international  trade taxes +'other')
INEQUAL  inequality (percentage share of income or consumption in the highest 10% of income
distribution)
INFANTM  infant mortality per 1000 of live births
28continued
SYMBOL  VARIABLE
INFL  inflation rate (average ) in %
1NTAX  indirect taxes in % of taxes, fees and contributions (INDIRECT/TAXES* 100)
LIFE  life expectancy at birth in years
LIQUID  liquidity (quasi money for 1992 divided by GDP in current prices for 1992)
PATENTS  total patent applications per 100.000 of population
POPULATION  total population in thousands
REVGDP  total public revenues in % of GDP
RFTIREES  POPULATION-labour force (employed+unemployed) -young (age group of 0-14)
SOCEXP  social transfers in % of total public expenditure (SOCGDP/EXPGDP*  100)
SOCGDP  social transfers in % of GDP
SOCIAL  social security contributions in % of GDP
SOCTAX  social security contributions in % of taxes, fees and contributions
(SOCIAL/TAXES* 100)
SOCWAGE  replacement rate or pension-wage rate (SOCGDP/WAGEGDP*  100)
SUBSIDY  share of subsidies in % of GDP
TAXES  Taxes, fees and contributions in % of GDP (TAXES =indirect taxes + direct taxes +
social security contributions + compulsory fees, fines and penalties)
TAXGDP  total tax receipts & social security contributions in % of GDP
TELEPHONES  telephone mainlines per 1000 of inhabitants
TERTIARY  university education rate (proportion of age-group concerned per thousand of age-group
entering tertiary education)
TRANSFER  subsidies and current transfers in % of total expenditure and lending minus repayments
TTAX  turnover tax (taxes on goods and services) & tariffs in % of TAXES
TTAXGDP  turnover tax (& tariffs) in % of GDP (TTAX * TAXGDP /100)
TTAXREV  turnover tax (& tariffs) in % of total public revenues
(TTAXGDP/REVGDP * 100)
UNEMPLOY  unemployment rate
WAGESEXP  share of wages in government expenditure
$PPP  the dollar price of one unit of purchasing power parities  (GDP$WB/GDPPPWB)
29Table.  Country  Samples and  Dummy Variable
COlUNTRY  COUNTRY  Samrnple
NAME  Sarnple  DUMMY  DUMMY  DUMMVy  NAME  (cont)  DUMMY  DUMMY  DUMMY
12  (cont.)  I2  3
Argentina  ]  Japan
Australia  *  Rep.Korea
Austria  I  Malaysia
Belgium  *  1  Mexico
Brazil  1  Netherlands  *
Canada  New  *
Zealand
Chile  ]  Norway  1
Columbia  I  Pakistan
Costa Rica  Philippines
Czech Rep.  1  Poland  *
Denmark  I  Portugal
Finland  I  Singapore
France  *  1  Spain  *
Gennany  *  I  Slovenia  *
Greece  *  Sweden
Hong Kong  Switzerland
Hungary  *  1  Thailand  _
India  Turkey
Indonesia  U.K.  *
Ireland  I  1  U.S.A.  *
Italy  *  Venezuela  I
|  TOTAL  ______  ______  42  26  4  7  15
Legend:
*  a country belongs to the small sample (used for single-regression  estimates) with OECD countries and Transition economies
All countries belong to the large sample (used for seemingly unrelated regressions).
Legend for Regional Dummies:
DUMMY I  Transition or Central European countries
DUMMY 2  Latin American countries
DUMMY 3  the European Union Countries & Norway
Note: The table indicates when a country dummy takes value 1, for all other countries the dummy has zero values.
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